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I. INTRODUCTION
In the late 1960s, Ruth Bader Ginsburg was a little-known law professor, expert in
such abstruse subjects as "conflict of laws" and the Swedish legal system. A de-
cade later, she had a place in American constitutional history, and was being tout-
ed for the Supreme Court.
Washington Post, July 19, 1993'
"Abstruse"? Well, I don't know how the King of Sweden feels, but in
my old neighborhood a word like that could get you into real trouble.
But that was then, and this is now. In any case, many conflict of laws
professors, irrespective of the kinds of neighborhoods from which they
originally sprung, may feel that the utility of our work may be
underappreciated. While few of us aspire to the heights Justice Ginsburg
has scaled, all of us know that conflict of laws can nourish other legal
specialties. In fact, our different perspective on the legal environment
may offer insights-even solutions-to problems that resist conventional
approaches. But we need to demonstrate more frequently how we can
help and how our approaches are already at work. Then, perhaps, we'll
get a little more respect.2
The purpose of this Article, then, is twofold. First, as the title suggests,
the Article will address an important problem in criminal procedure that
arises along the boundary where federal and state courts meet. Second,
it will demonstrate the potential that an understanding of conflict of laws
can assist in an interdisciplinary approach to such a problem. In gaining
an insight on the real-world utility of the choice of law doctrine as ap-
1. David Von Drehle, Redefining Fair With a Careful Assault; Step-by-Step Strate-
gy Produced Strides for Equal Protection, WASH. POST, July 19, 1993, at Al.
2. Some years ago Professor James Martin tackled this problem in an imaginative
way. In the first edition of his casebook on Conflict of Laws, Professor Martin insert-
ed Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857), at the very beginning of the book. See
JAMES A- MARTIN, CONFLICT OF LAWS: CASES AND METHODS 5-20 (1978). By demonstrat-
ing that this case, so notorious and so significant in American history, could poten-
tially be defused by applying conflicts principles, Martin apparently hoped to make
clear how relevant conflicts ideas can be. I suspect that the success of this approach
was muted by the volatility of the underlying issues of human freedom in the case.
In my own class, I found that some students understandably found it difficult to
discuss such a case in the detached framework of choice of law. For that reason,
much of the value of the case was lost. Thus, when Professor Lea Brilmayer took
over the casebook for the third edition, Scott v. Sanford was removed. See JAMES A.
MARTIN & LEA BRILMAYER, CONFLICT OF LAWS: CASES AND METHODS (3d ed. 1990). It
was a good try, but it was also good to recognize that the price of the lesson may
have been too high in this case.
plied to another body of law, we will also have a chance to see the con-
sequences that follow when judges do not apply judicial doctrine consis-
tently.
H. THE PROBLEMS
The criminal procedure/choice of law problems this Article will ad-
dress go to the interplay between federal and state police officers, on the
one hand, and conflicting federal and state criminal procedures on the
other. Specifically, the Article considers what law should apply in a fed-
eral court if a state police search turns up evidence in a way that violates
applicable state law, but not federal law. May a federal court admit that
evidence when a state court might be obligated to suppress it? Even if a
federal court may admit the evidence, should it do so? Conversely, what
is an appropriate result in federal court if state police obey their own
law, but fail to meet a nonconstitutional requirement that is applicable to
federal officers?
Those basic questions lead to other uncertainties. For example, if there
are circumstances in which federal courts should accommodate the inter-
ests and concerns behind the search-and-seizure law of a state, what
should be the standards for identifying the interests that might deserve
such deference? And what if the evidence is the product of a joint feder-
al/state investigation?
Current law addresses such questions, but not always satisfactorily.
Thus, as we shall see shortly, federal courts have two tendencies: (1)
they generally apply federal law to issues of admissibility, irrespective of
the applicable state law, the interest behind that law, or the identity of
the police-federal or state-who gather the evidence;3 and (2) they are
inclined to defer to state procedure if application of that procedure re-
sults in the admissibility of inculpatory evidence.' Those two tendencies
might at first appear to contain a fundamental contradiction. As we shall
see, however, there is less friction than meets the eye. Recognition of
that fact will help us to a possible resolution of these knotty conflicts
problems.
This Article will demonstrate the tendencies identified above and offer
approaches to resolution of these problems that improve on the current
analyses. Such approaches will draw on ideas about competing judicial
3. See, e.g., United States v. Scolnick, 392 F.2d 320, 323-36 (3d Cir.) (admitting
evidence obtained by Philadelphia police in violation of a state statute), cert. denied,
392 U.S. 931 (1968).
4. See, e.g., Jackson v. United States, 354 F.2d 980, 981 (lst Cir. 1965) (applying
state law that admitted evidence, rather than federal "no-knock" law that would have
required suppression).
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systems that have developed in the area of conflict of laws. In some
measure, adoption of these proposals for improved methods may require
significant adjustment by federal courts.
At the same time, we should understand what this Article will not
address. First, it is not about whether state law can or should constrain
federal police officers when they investigate potential federal crimes.
There may well be circumstances in which federal officers should at
least try to conduct themselves in a manner consistent with the criminal
law of the state in which they work. It is not the purpose of this Article,
however, to identify either the constitutional or prudential considerations
that might guide federal courts in determining when federal police
should obey state law. Instead, this Article is more concerned about
when, if ever, federal courts themselves should defer to state criminal
procedure rules relating to searches by state police.
Second, the Article is not about the federal constitutional safeguards
available to defendants in all federal and state criminal proceedings.
Indeed, it is important to keep in mind that the problems we shall exam-
ine come with an underlying thesis that state police officers conducting a
search have already complied with the bedrock requirements of the
Fourth Amendment. Even with such constitutional concerns aside, how-
ever, we have more than enough to explore and uncover.
Ill. STATE-GATHERED EVIDENCE IN FEDERAL COURTS: Two RESULTS
When defendants in federal prosecutions move to suppress evidence
obtained by state officers in an unlawful, but constitutionally valid,
search, the motion rests on the supposition that the search violated ei-
ther state law, federal law, or both. If the search violated both state and
federal laws, and an exclusionary rule applies, the evidence should nor-
mally be excluded. If the search violated only one body of law, however,
then the decision to admit or suppress the evidence will only be made
after the court decides which law-state or federal-to apply. The cases
discussed in this Article exemplify the results and reasoning of federal
courts when choosing between the two bodies of law. The decisions thus
provide insights into the weaknesses present in current approaches, as
well as the keys to improved analysis.
A. When State Law Controls
In United States v. Moore,' an Omaha, Nebraska police officer ob-
tained a state warrant to search the defendant's residence for controlled
substances.' The warrant specifically permitted the authorities to "'enter
the premises described above without knocking or announcing their
authority.'"' Although the original plan was to prosecute the defendant in
state court, a federal proceeding was later substituted because "[flederal
law calls for twice the maximum punishment" available under state law.'
The defendant moved to suppress the evidence obtained in the course of
the state search.' The stated ground was that the search violated the
standards of 18 U.S.C. § 3109, which restricts the circumstances in which
federal searches may be initiated through forced entry of a house."
The court first held that the police officers' search of the residence did
not violate the requirements of the Fourth Amendment in a way that
would have produced a constitutional mandate to suppress evidence."
Had it been otherwise, of course, no choice of law issue would have
arisen. With the constitutional issue aside, there remained the troubling
question of the applicability of § 3109 to a search by state police officers.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that
§ 3109 was inapplicable to a state search conducted "totally without
federal involvement." 2 The court noted that the Omaha police did not
intentionally violate the federal statute governing their conduct." In-
5. 956 F.2d 843 (8th Cir. 1992).
6. Id. at 845.
7. 1d (quoting the "no knock" search warrant issued by a Nebraska County Court
judge).
8. Id. The defendant lived within 1,000 feet of a school, triggering the higher
sentence under federal law. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 846; see 18 U.S.C. § 3109 (1988). In Moore, the prosecution agreed that
if § 3109 applied to the state search, the statute was violated. Moore, 956 F.2d at
846. Further, the prosecution conceded that the appropriate remedy then would be to
exclude evidence obtained in the search. Id. The threshold question, of course, was
whether § 3109 applied to the state search.
11. Moore, 956 F.2d at 849-51. Actually, the court danced around this point a little
bit. The court seemed to consider that the state warrant was based upon an insuffi-
cient showing of probable cause to enter without knocking. Id. at 850-51. Neverthe-
less, even if the showing was insufficient, the police had reasonable ground for be-
lieving that the showing was sufficient, thus satisfying the "good faith" exception to
the exclusionary rule laid down in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984). Moore,
956 F.2d at 851.
12. Moore, 956 F.2d at 847. The Eighth Circuit noted that a search in which feder-
al police participated in a significant way alongside state officers "must comply with
federal law." Id. at 847 n.3. As we shall see shortly, however, the law may not be
quite that clear. See infra notes 13-27 and related text.
13. Moore, 956 F.2d at 847.
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stead, § 3109 was "irrelevant to [the state police] and the County Court
judge at the time the warrant issued."14 Thus, the state police, relying on
the only bodies of law, state law and the federal constitution, that they
could be expected to follow, acted in good faith when they executed the
state warrant.'5
Moore contains an interesting dissent, 6 but the case is more signifi-
cant for the interplay of two factors identified as the basis for the court's
decision. The first is the federal interest underlying § 3109. Moore found
that the purpose behind the "no-knock" prohibition in § 3109 was to
deter police misconduct. 7 In assessing the applicability of deterrence to
the facts of Moore, the court explained that, because the evidence ob-
tained in the search was probative and reliable, it merited exclusion only
if the deterrence benefit of exclusion was more than a mere hypothetical
possibility.'8 That conclusion led the court to its second consideration,
as well as the interplay between the two considerations.
Second, the court noted that Moore did not contain facts suggesting
any sort of malice on the part of the police. 9 To the contrary, it was
clear that the police did not set out to violate § 3109.20 In fact, the offi-
cers had reason to believe that the only applicable constraints on their
behavior were those of the federal constitution and state law.2' As the
court put it, § 3109 was "irrelevant" to the police." That meant the offi-
cers were acting in reasonable reliance on state law, not § 3109.
The court's approach is thus rather easy to follow. First, the court
identified the two factors decisive to its holding and examined their in-
terplay with one another. The court could then conclude, reasonably,
14. Id.
15. Id. at 850-51.
16. Id. at 851-55 (Beam, J., dissenting). Judge Beam reasoned, inter alia, that the
majority misapplied Nebraska law. Id. (Beam, J., dissenting). According to Judge
Beam, the Omaha police violated the state statute as well as § 3109. Id. at 854
(Beam, J., dissenting). This is, of course, an example of the important, if apparently
mundane, lesson mentioned infra note 24: In conflicts matters, it is always wise, as a
threshold matter, to ensure that the laws in question really conflict with one another.
If they do not conflict, there is no reason to address the choice of law issue.
17. Moore, 956 F.2d at 847 (quoting United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 542
(1975)).
18. Id. at 848.
19. Id. at 847.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 848-49.
22. Id.
that if deterrence requires police to consult bodies of law not familiar to
them, and whose application to their activities they had little reason to
anticipate, the deterrent benefit that might be achieved is speculative at
best. In other words, because the court believed that a federal deterrent
interest underlying § 3109 is not usually transgressed in cases like Moore,
where state police act in good faith reliance on state law and the federal
constitution and without help from federal officers, state law should con-
trol.
The Moore majority reported that most federal decisions addressing
the applicability of § 3109 to state searches have declined to impose
§ 3109 on state police activity,' and this observation is probably accu-
rate. 4 Apart from the relatively narrow spectrum of § 3109, however,
23. Id. at 847.
24. Five of the cases cited in Moore probably support the court's conclusion. In
United States v. Mitchell, 783 F.2d 971 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 860 (1986),
the court held that a search by Oklahoma city police in execution of a state warrant
had to meet the standard of the Federal Fourth Amendment, but not § 3109. Curious-
ly, however, the court also suggested that potentially relevant state law did not apply.
Id. at 973. The court in United States v. Andrus, 775 F.2d 825 (7th Cir. 1985), re-
fused to apply § 3109 to a search by Bakersfield, California police in execution of a
state warrant. Id. at 844 (stating that "because the California statute provides a stan-
dard equivalent to" § 3109, the court need not decide the issue). Similarly, in United
States v. Jefferson, 714 F.2d 689 (7th Cir. 1983), appeal after remand, 760 F.2d 821
(7th Cir.), cert. granted and judgment vacated, 474 U.S. 806 (1985), the United States
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit refused to apply § 3109 to a state search in
Milwaukee, Wisconsin authorized by a state court. Interestingly, Jefferson applied
§ 3109 to a second search in Wisconsin undertaken jointly by federal and state offi-
cers pursuant to a federal warrant. Id. at 694. The court held, however, that the
requirements of § 3109 were met in that second search. Id. The United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit also measured a search by California police in exe-
cution of a state warrant by the standard of state law, not § 3109. United States v.
Valenzuela, 596 F.2d 1361 (9th Ci.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 865 (1979). Valenzuela
also held, however, that the search met the requirements of § 3109. Id. at 1365. The
final case to support Moore is a federal district court decision holding that § 3109
was inapplicable to a search by Maine police officers in execution of a state warrant
United States v. Daoust, 728 F. Supp. 41, 47 (D. Me. 1989), affd, 916 F.2d 757 (1st
Cir. 1990).
The sixth case, however, seems distinguishable from Moore for a reason that
deserves some attention. Simons v. Montgomery County Police Officers, 762 F.2d 30
(4th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1054 (1986), was a civil suit for alleged viola-
tions of the defendant's federal civil rights by several Maryland police officers in the
course of a search of the plaintiffs house. After the court found that the search met
constitutional standards, it also held that § 3109 and state common law imposed
identical duties on police officers. Id. at 33. To that extent, there was no need for
the court to make a ruling as to the applicability of § 3109 to a search by state offi-
cers, because there was no choice, of law decision to make. In such circumstances it
is probably a good practice to avoid the choice of law decision entirely.
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other courts have reported that the clear preponderance of federal deci-
sions favor the application of federal, rather than state, law.'
If Moore is a little unconventional because it applies state law rather
than federal law, it is highly conventional in another sense. After choos-
ing state law, the ultimate product was the admission of inculpatory
evidence and affirmance of a trial court's determination of guilt. As we
shall see, the decision to admit inculpatory evidence adheres to a pattern
followed by almost all the cases we will discuss, irrespective of whether
the initial decision was to apply state or federal law.' As a general rule
state criminal procedure will apply in federal prosecutions, if at all, only
when police conduct meets the standard of that law, and the result is
therefore to admit the inculpatory evidence. Moore identified two useful
factors27 to apply in making the choice of law decision, but the case is
also useful as an indicator of a judicial predilection in favor of admitting
evidence and convicting defendants.
B. When Federal Law Controls
Aside from Moore and other cases dealing with the applicability of 28
U.S.C. § 3109 to state searches, it is generally easier to find federal deci-
sions that choose federal, rather than state, law. Some of these decisions
follow reasoning similar to that of United States v. Combs.' That case
arose from a police search of a vehicle during which the Kentucky police
found a sack containing a large quantity of counterfeit twenty-dollar
bills.' Both the prosecution and defendants apparently agreed that the
search satisfied the requirements of the Fourth Amendment, but the
defendants suggested that the search did not meet the higher standard
imposed by the Kentucky constitution.'
25. See infra notes 28-38 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 63-132 and accompanying text.
27. The two factors are whether state officials who violated federal statute had an
objectively reasonable basis to believe they were complying with state law and the
Fourth Amendment and whether the state officials acted without federal involvement
Moore, 956 F.2d at 847-48.
28. 672 F.2d 574 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1111 (1982).
29. Id. at 577.
30. Id. The defendants relied on § 10 of the Kentucky Constitution: "The people
shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers and possessions, from unreasonable
search and seizure; and no warrant shall issue to search any place, or seize any
person or thing, without describing them as nearly as may be, nor without probable
cause supported by oath or affirmation. Ky. CONST. § 10.
The court swept away this argument by affirming the conviction. In
fact, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit summarized
its view in a single sentence: "The present case concerns a Federal
crime; states are not free to impose on Federal courts requirements more
strict than those of the Federal laws or Constitution."3
With little subtlety but substantial accuracy, the Sixth Circuit identified
an assumption that is central to understanding the rationale federal
courts use when trying to determine the applicability of state procedure
in federal prosecutions. Federal courts often hold that in criminal cases
the Supremacy Clause' insulates them from any affirmative duty to ap-
ply state criminal procedure that conflicts with federal law.'
Sometimes the Supremacy Clause is only implicit in a court's reason-
ing,' but it is always a consideration. For example, in United States v.
One Parcel of Real Property,' a claimant sought to recover property
that had been seized after a drug search.' The claimant alleged that the
search by state officers violated state law." Yet, the court held that ar-
gument irrelevant to a federal case.' The court reasoned that federal
officers could have collected the evidence without regard to state law.9
31. Combs, 672 F.2d at 578.
32. U.S. CONST., art. VI, cl. 2.
33. See, e.g., United States v. Hall, 543 F.2d 1229, 1232 (9th Cir. 1976) (en banc)
(stating that federal law prevails in a federal criminal proceeding when federal and
state law are in conflict), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1075 (1977). Older Supreme Court
dicta supports this use of ft Supremacy Clause. Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28,
33 (1927) ("We do not question the right of the federal government to avail itself of
evidence improperly seized by state officers operating entirely upon their own ac-
count.").
34. See, e.g., United States v. Singer, 943 F.2d 758, 761 (7th Cir. 1991) (stating
that, without explicit reference to Supremacy Clause, violation of state law is irrele-
vant in federal prosecution). In United States v. Sutherland, 929 F.2d 765, 769 (1st
Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 822 (1991), the court made no explicit reference to the
Supremacy Clause, but explained that "[the court] begin[s] with the proposition that
federal law governs federal prosecutions in federal court." Id. at 769. Other courts
share this philosophy, and although the Supremacy Clause may not be explicitly men-
tioned, it informs the courts' analysis. See United States v. Jorge, 865 F.2d 6, 10 n.2
(1st Cir.) ("We reject the contention that state law governs suppression issues in a
federal criminal trial."), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1027 (1989); United States v. Little, 753
F.2d 1420, 1434 (9th Cir. 1984) ("Evidence obtained in violation of neither the Consti-
tution nor federal law is admissible in federal court proceedings -without regard to
state law.") (emphasis in original).
35. 873 F.2d 7 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 891 (1989).
36. Id. at 8.
37. Id. The claimant alleged that the warrant was executed at night without good
cause, yet he conceded that it was still "daytime" by federal definition. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
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Although the decision never mentioned the Supremacy Clause, the
foundation of the decision seems apparent.
The power federal courts enjoy under the Supremacy Clause to disre-
gard otherwise applicable state law seems clear, and it is not the purpose
of this Article to challenge that particular feature of our federal system.
Nonetheless, agreement that federal courts enjoy the power to disregard
state criminal procedure does not necessarily end the analysis. We still
must consider whether federal courts should always exercise such pow-
er. In other words, supremacy at its best is probably a lot like good rich
chocolate ice cream: both give the greatest satisfaction only when they
are indulged in in moderation. Moreover, a substantial number of federal
decisions agree, in principle at least, that prudential considerations may
appropriately constrain supremacy. Accordingly, such cases identify fac-
tors that help the courts decide when they may or should exercise their
discretion to apply state law.
IV. FACTORS COURTS CONSIDER
Unlike United States v. Combs," the reasoning in many other cases
suggests a disinclination to wield the Supremacy Clause like a blunt
instrument. Certainly for the opinions that follow, supremacy remains the
ultimate device for protecting federal interests. Yet, it does not inevitably
rule out the possibility of applying state law to state police search-




40. 672 F.2d 574 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1111 (1982).
41. The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit believes that applying
state rules for admissibility of evidence in a federal criminal prosecution may exist, if
at all, only "in an extreme case of flagrant abuse of the law by state officials, where
federal officials seek to capitalize on that abuse." United States v. Sutherland, 929
F.2d 765, 770 (lst Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 822 (1991). The Sutherland court also
concluded that, at least in the area of evidence developed through electronic surveil-
lance of communications, it preferred no exception at all. Id. at 771. In doing so, the
court characterized the alternative as one that forced federal courts "into intricate
analytical maneuvers to escape a poorly conceived exception." Id.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit asserted that "all
other circuits that have been presented with this issue have concluded that 'evidence
admissible under federal law cannot be excluded because it would be inadmissible
under state law.'" United States v. Pforzheimer, 826 F.2d 200, 204 (2d Cir. 1987)
(quoting United States v. Quinones, 758 F.2d 40, 43 (1st Cir. 1985)). In the course of
this Article we will see enough cases to indicate that the Second Circuit's assertion
describes most of the decisions in this area, but certainly not all.
While pondering the application of state law, cases identify a range of
factors courts should weigh in determining when to apply state criminal
procedure law over its federal counterpart. The factors are: good
faith/reasonable reliance, uniformity of federal procedure, reluctance to
decide uncertain questions of state law, comity, concerns about forum
shopping, availability of other sanctions for police misconduct, reluc-
tance to expand exclusionary rules, characterization of law as merely
procedural, joint operations by federal and state police, and state courts
as laboratories for criminal procedure. At the outset, it is important to
remember two points. First, the weight given each factor varies substan-
tially from one case to another, depending on the facts of the individual
cases. Second, there is substantial overlap among these factors. I shall
discuss each of the factors that the courts seem to prefer.
A. Good Faith/Reasonable Reliance
When police officers behave in "good faith" reliance on a particular
body of law, courts generally weigh that factor in favor of applying the
law upon which police rely.' Because state police are more likely to
rely on state procedure rather than its federal counterpart, this factor,
when considered, tends to weigh in favor of the application of state law.
In most cases the concepts of "good faith" and "reasonable reliance"
are symbiotic. That makes sense because, in the absence of an unusual
situation, one is more likely to give credence to an officer's assertion of
good faith when it rests upon his or her expectation that the law normal-
ly guiding that officer is operative. But one court separated the two con-
cepts. By doing so, it permitted subjective good faith to overcome the
requirements of the state law upon which state police should have relied,
but which they failed to obey. In United States v. Dudek,4' the United
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit disregarded a failure by
state police to meet state requirements for returning a warrant and re-
cording the inventory of items seized in the search.' The court held
"that nonconstitutional, nonprejudicial and inadvertent failures to follow
42. See, e.g., United States v. Moore, 956 F.2d 843, 847-48, (8th Cir. 1992) (applying
state law to search by state police who relied on it); United States v. Mitro, 880 F.2d
1480, 1485 (1st Cir. 1989) (holding that good faith reliance by federal and state offi-
cers on state law justified admission of evidence derived from a Canadian wiretap);
United States v. Crawford, 657 F.2d 1041, 1047 (9th Cir. 1981) (involving a state
search and finding a violation of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41 irrelevant
unless defendant can demonstrate prejudice or "evidence of intentional and deliberate
disregard of the Rule").
43. 530 F.2d 684 (6th Cir. 1976), appeal after remand, 560 F.2d 1288 (6th Cir.
1977), and cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1037 (1978).
44. Id. at 688.
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the post-search and seizure requirements of Ohio's rule which are in-
volved here do not require application" of an exclusionary rule.'
B. Uniformity of Federal Procedure
The desirability of permitting courts in the same judicial system to
process cases in uniform ways is an obvious benefit, both to those
courts and to efforts to apply just principles uniformly. Thus, it is not
surprising that a federal court would weigh this factor in favor of apply-
ing federal law over state law.'
C. Reluctance to Decide Uncertain Questions of State Law
An important federal judicial doctrine rests on the belief that, when
federal courts are faced with difficult and uncertain questions of state
law, the courts should consider the possibility of referring the case to
state courts.47 This "abstention" doctrine developed in the context of
civil litigation. It does not directly apply to federal criminal prosecutions,
because the appropriate courts to hear such cases are federal courts.
Thus, in federal criminal cases, unlike diversity cases, federal courts do
not have the ability to defer to state courts by dismissing the federal ac-
tion to allow a state action to commence.' Yet, the federal courts' un-
easiness about deciding unresolved questions of state criminal procedure
reflects the same policy considerations underlying the abstention doc-
trine in civil cases. The key difference-and it is an important difference,
indeed-is that, in federal criminal litigation, the result has been to favor
application of federal criminal procedure, rather than dismissal.49
45. Id. at 691 (emphasis added).
46. See United States v. Pforzheimer, 826 F.2d 200, 204 (2d Cir. 1987) ("Clearly, it
is important that there be uniformity of evidentiary rules among the federal courts.").
On a related point, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ex-
pressed concern that the adoption of an approach that might permit application of
state procedure in at least some circumstances would create too much variety among
the circuits. United States v. Chavez-Vernaza, 844 F.2d 1368, 1371-74 (9th Cir. 1987),
cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1324 (1994).
47. See, e.g., United Serv. Life Ins. Co. v. Delaney, 328 F.2d 483, 484-85 (5th Cir.)
(en banc), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 935 (1964).
48. See Pforzheimer, 826 F.2d at 204 (refusing to apply state constitutional protec-
tion in part because the extent of that protection was uncertain).
49. Federal courts confronted with controlling and uncertain questions of state civil
law often have access to a certification statute, which permits the federal court to
"certify" such a question to the high court of the state whose law is at issue. See,
D. Comity
As applied in the context of competing federal and state criminal pro-
cedure, comity might sometimes cause a federal court to "defer to a
state's more stringent exclusionary rule with respect to evidence secured
without federal involvement. "' In other words, to the extent that princi-
ples of comity apply, they probably weigh in favor of applying state crim-
inal procedure rather than its federal counterpart.
E. Concerns about Forum Shopping
Defendants may argue that when state police violate state law in the
course of a search that does not violate federal law, federal and state
authorities may be tempted to cooperate in the use of that evidence in a
federal prosecution.5 ' To the extent that such forum shopping is identi-
fied, should courts not deny the federal prosecutor the use of such state-
supplied evidence? One court rejected that argument, claiming that con-
sideration is insignificant.52 Generally, the paucity of discussion on this
issue has encouraged application of federal procedure.
e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3201 (1994); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 480.061 (1990). Interest-
ingly, neither the Kansas nor the Minnesota statute restricts the questions that may
be certified to noncriminal questions. Although it would be highly unusual, a federal
court inclined to apply state criminal procedure, but reluctant to do so because it is
uncertain how to apply that state law, could conceivably use a certification statute
like those cited above to ask the state high court to address such questions. Assum-
ing such a course of action is open, the federal court would then have to walt until
it received an answer before proceeding with the case.
Alternatively, a federal court might simply make an educated assessment as to
what a state's law might be. This is probably the most common approach in civil
cases because it avoids the delay and expense associated with abstention and certifi-
cation. Yet, it produces its own uncertainties about the quality of the law that the
federal courts apply. For an extreme example of the problem, see Nolan v. Trans-
ocean Air Lines, 276 F.2d 280, 281 (2d Cir.) ("Our principal task . . . is to determine
what the New York courts would think the California courts would think on an issue
about which neither has thought."), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 836 (1960), and judgment
set aside, 365 U.S. 293 (1961).
50. United States v. Henderson, 721 F.2d 662, 665 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467
U.S. 1218 (1984); see also Chavez-Vernaza, 844 F.2d at 1372 (weighing the value of
comity, but rejecting it in favor of uniformity of law achieved by using federal proce-
dure); cf. United States v. Rickus, 737 F.2d 360, 364 (3d. Cir. 1984) ("We are not
insensitive to the claim that we should not encourage state officiais to violate princi-
ples central to the state's social and governmental order.").
51. See, e.g., Pforzheimer, 826 F.2d at 204.
52. Id. at 204 (holding risk of such forum to be minimal).
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F. Availability of Other Sanctions for Police Miscbnduct
More than a few cases refer to the possibility of controlling state po-
lice misbehavior by means other than excluding the evidence in federal
prosecutions.' When this factor is weighed, federal courts generally
conclude that they should reject the application of state criminal proce-
dure in federal prosecutions.'
G. Reluctance to Expand Exclusionary Rules
Sometimes courts note that the exclusion of probative inculpatory
evidence, however necessary it may be in some circumstances, is not a
remedy to be applied promiscuously.' Although it may appear that the
court has already decided in favor of federal law when it begins to ex-
plain itself in such a manner, that is not inevitably the result. We should
recall that in United States v. Moore,' the court's reluctance to apply
federal law was based in part on its skepticism that doing so would ef-
fectively deter police misconduct.57 When a court has a policy to limit
the expansion of the exclusionary rules, it is likely that the court will
choose the law-state or federal-that results in admission the evidence.
53. See, e.g., United States v. One Parcel of Real Property, 873 F.2d 7, 8 (1st Cir.)
(stating that exclusion of evidence in state court only is a more "close fitting" deter-
rent), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 891 (1989); Rickus, 737 F.2d at 364 (explaining that the
exclusion of evidence in a state prosecution is a possible "sanction," as is the possi-
bility of a civil suit against police).
54. See, e.g., United States v. D'Antoni, 874 F.2d 1214, 1218-19 (7th Cir. 1989) (re-
fusing to apply state exclusionary rule and citing the possibility of "other sanctions"
as means of deterring police misconduct). The court in United States v. Dudek, 530
F.2d 684 (6th Cir. 1976), appeal after remand, 560 F.2d 1288 (6th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1037 (1978), held that, when state police violate a state duty to
promptly return a warrant and verify an inventory of items seized, federal law ap-
plies. Id. at 691. In these cases, using federal law is appropriate because, inter alia,
there are "many possible methods of vindicating the inventory and return sections of
the rule other than suppression of the lawfully seized evidence." Id.
55. See, e.g., Rickus, 737 F.2d at 364 (stating that the exclusionary rule is a neces-
sary remedy, but should be rarely applied).
56. 956 F.2d 843 (8th Cir. 1992).
57. Id. at 847. Explaining its decision not to apply federal law to a search by state
police, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit noted the "high so-
cial costs of the exclusionary rule." Id. The court quoted with approval Justice
Cardozo's remark that exclusionary rules produce the unsatisfactory result that "It]he
criminal is to go free because the constable has blundered." Id. (quoting People v.
Defore, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (N.Y.), cert. denied, 270 U.S. 657 (1926)).
H. Characterization of Law as Merely Procedural
If the state law at issue goes merely to matters of pure procedure and
does not implicate the deep-seated, fundamental values of a state, refusal
to apply state law may be perceived as having a less corrosive effect on
the federal/state relationship.' To the extent that federal courts identify
a state law as essentially procedural, they will typically apply federal law.
L Joint Operations by Federal and State Police
Some cases suggest that the absence of federal officers at the scene of
a state search justifies the application of state law.' Other decisions
indicate that the presence or absence of federal officers at the scene of a
search conducted under state law has little relevance to the court's deci-
sion to choose federal or state law.'
J. State Courts as Laboratories for Criminal Procedure
The Supreme Court has long held that states may, as a matter of state
law, impose standards on police searches and seizures not required by
the Fourth Amendment.6' Many states have taken advantage of the op-
portunity to expand their protections for persons accused of crimes and
58. United States v. Sotomayor, 592 F.2d 1219, 1225-26 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 442
U.S. 919 (1979).
59. See, e.g., Moore, 956 F.2d at 847 (citing fact that state police "act[ed] totally
without federal involvement" as part of reasoning for applying state law); cf. United
States v. Krawiec, 627 F.2d 577, 579-80 (Ist Cir. 1980) (finding participation of federal
officers not relevant when all involved in search believed it was conducted under
state warrant and for purposes of state prosecution).
60. See, e.g., United States v. One Parcel of Real Property, 873 F.2d 7, 8 (1st Cir.)
(stating that evidence is admissible without regard to state law if state police were
doing what federal law would have permitted federal officers to do), cert. denied, 493
U.S. 891 (1989); United States v. Jorge, 865 F.2d 6, 10 n.2 (1st Cir.) (explaining that
federal forum is the central issue, not whether search was exclusively under state
control), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1027 (1989); United States v. Aiudi, 835 F.2d 943 (1st
Cir. 1987) (holding that even though there was a state search and a federal prosecu-
tion, violation of state law was irrelevant), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 978 (1988); United
States v. Pforzheimer, 826 F.2d 200, 202-03 (2d Cir. 1987) (applying federal law with-
out regard to fact that "evidence in question was solely the product of a state inves-
tigation"); Jackson v. United States, 354 F.2d 980 (1st Cir. 1965) (applying state law
without weighing fact that both federal and state officers participated in a joint war-
rantless search).
61. See, e.g., Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 719 (1975) (allowing states to impose
greater police restrictions); Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 60-61 (1968) (letting
states "develop its own law of search and seizure to meet the needs of local law
enforcement"); Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 62 (1967) (allowing states to "im-
pose higher standards on searches and seizures").
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thus have served as laboratories for the rest of the country. Federal
courts addressing the applicability of such laws, in cases where the evi-
dence was developed by state police officers, might have been expected
to defer to state law as a means of encouraging the experiments. In do-
ing so, they might also strengthen the bonds of conty that should exist
between the two judicial systems. Nonetheless, the desirability of experi-
mentation in the state laboratories appears to carry very little weight
when it is raised as a ground for applying state law in federal prosecu-
tions. Thus in United States v. Combs,' the court acknowledged the
"general applicability" of such laws in state prosecutions, but also held
that "states are not free to impose on Federal courts requirements more
strict than those of the Federal laws or Constitution." '
V. EVALUATING THE FACTORS
The ten above considerations might be valuable tools for federal
courts that are not inclined automatically to swing the supremacy ham-
mer only if the considerations, and the courts using them, meet two
fundamental requirements. First, a consideration must make good sense
in its own right. That is, the factor must address real concerns and pro-
vide a basis for solving conflicts between state and federal law. If it ad-
dresses a concern that looks good on paper, but does not arise in the
real world of federal or state law enforcement, it will be irrelevant to
courts' analyses. Similarly, if applying a factor affords no foundation for
principled, predictable results, it will have little practical value to courts
that are struggling with a difficult problem.
Second, a factor should provide a universal standard that guides
courts, so that courts choose law without regard to results in individual
cases. If, instead, a factor is only a tool for manipulating results to satisfy
individual judges' views of justice, it may provide highly individualized
justice at the expense of principled rules of law to which all of
us-federal and state police, legislators, and judges, as well as defen-
dants and other citizens-should be bound. Thus, if a factor is too flex-
ible, lending itself readily to results-oriented maneuvers, it may be almost
too "practical."
62. 672 F.2d 574 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1111 (1982).
63. Id. at 578; cf. United States v. D'Antoni, 874 F.2d 1214, 1218-19 (7th Cir. 1989)
(rejecting argument that applying federal law to state search "would be encouraging
state officials to violate state law").
With those cautions in mind, we may now return to our list of ten
prudential factors that courts weigh when deciding which law to choose.
Each factor adds to the ultimate choice of law decision, but not neces-
sarily to the same degree.
A. Good Faith/Reasonable Reliance
In a related context, the Supreme Court issued directions with some
applicability to our problems. United States v. Leon' denied application
of the Fourth Amendment's exclusionary rule to situations where police
conduct a search with a good-faith belief in their authority under a war-
rant that later proves to be invalid.' The Court reasoned that if the pri-
mary purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter police misconduct, it
has little relevance to situations where police sensibly, but erroneously,
believe they have complied with the law.'
The Court's rationale in Leon implicates choice of law concerns. If
police who make an innocent mistake are entitled to Leon's good-faith
exception to the exclusionary rule, why should federal courts not apply
state criminal procedure in situations where state police reasonably re-
lied on that state law? Indeed, the argument for using the state law on
which state police rely is stronger than the case Leon makes for excusing
mistakes. After all, state police who rely on and comply with state law
have made no mistake. It should take a strong federal interest to
overcome that kind of reliance.
If state police fail to meet their standards but comply, perhaps by
chance, with the federal standard, state law should still be applied. Ab-
sent a strong federal interest in applying federal law, state police should
be penalized under state law for violation of state exclusionary rules. The
only exception to this might be when state officers reasonably anticipate
that federal procedure displaces state law because federal and state po-
lice conduct a joint search-and-seizure operation.67
The only decisions that seem to value good faith reliance on state law
by state officers are cases in which the conduct of the state police can
meet those standards. When state police can meet the standards of fed-
eral law, but perhaps not their own state law, most courts are noticeably
silent about the importance of "good faith" reliance on state law. Addi-
tionally, those courts tend to apply the standard of federal law, which, by
happy circumstance, the police in those cases are able to meet.8
64. 468 U.S. 897 (1984) (creating limited "good faith" exception to application of
exclusionary rule to searches conducted under warrants later found to be flawed).
65. Id.
66. Id. at 908-13.
67. See supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text.
68. See, e.g., United States v. Chavez-Vernaza, 844 F.2d 1368, 1373 (9th Cir. 1987)
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This use of the good faith factor raises at least a suspicion that courts
apply it selectively, with the result of admitting inculpatory evidence in
mind. Thus, while considering the good faith of police officers makes a
lot of sense, its apparently selective use suggests that the second test of
a factor mentioned above-choosing law without regard to results in a
particular case-has not been met.
This apparent manipulation of good faith may achieve justice in indi-
vidual cases. Even those who acknowledge the deterrent value of
exclusionary rules may not enjoy the suppression of probative inculpato-
ry evidence in cases involving heinous crimes. It is also understandable
that judges do not like to free defendants by suppressing probative evi-
dence that establishes guilt. Nonetheless, it is precisely such manipula-
tion of an otherwise legitimate consideration that hinders the develop-
ment of principled guidelines for the prudential application of state crim-
inal procedure in federal prosecutions.
B. Uniformity of Federal Procedure
Obviously, federal courts have a legitimate interest in routinely apply-
ing a body of federal procedure that is reasonably uniform across the
country. To think otherwise suggests that federal courts should apply
some kind of local procedure that would produce dissimilar results in
otherwise similar cases. That is clearly undesirable. It is not surprising
that the Supreme Court has long held that federal criminal procedure
will normally apply in federal prosecutions.'
Thus, considerations of uniformity will usually operate in favor of
applying federal law even to state searches, particularly when the con-
flicting state procedure is unclear or otherwise difficult to apply. This is
not the same, however, as concluding that federal procedures should
always apply in the kinds of cases we are discussing in this Article. To
reach that conclusion, one would have to give little or no weight to
(admitting evidence of state search of bank records, but alleged violation of state law
is irrelevant because federal law controls), cert denied, 114 S. Ct. 1324 (1994); Unit-
ed States v. Rickus, 737 F.2d 360, 363-64 (3d Cir. 1984) (admitting evidence from
state search arguably violating state constitution, but citing "general rule" that federal
law controls); see also United States v. Mitchell, 783 F.2d 971, 973-74 (10th Cir.) (ad-
mitting evidence from state search that arguably violated state law restrictions but
focusing only on whether Fourth Amendment was violated), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 860
(1986).
69. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 469 (1928) (upholding the importance
of a uniform federal approach to admitting evidence in federal prosecutions).
proper evaluations of such factors as good faith reliance on state law,
comity, and well-founded concerns about police and prosecutorial forum
shopping. This approach seems unacceptable if state interests are to get
any consideration at all.
C. Reluctance to Decide Uncertain Questions of State Law
Federal courts handling civil cases have a number of techniques to
help them identify uncertain state law. Unfortunately, some of those
techniques are less effective when a federal court hears a criminal case.
Abstention is unavailable because state courts cannot hear federal crimi-
nal matters. Certification of criminal procedure questions, although theo-
retically useful, runs into some of the same obstacles of cost and delay
that have impeded its effectiveness in civil cases, but the problems are
more acute in criminal cases."0 Delay in getting answers to questions
certified from criminal cases could have high human costs, with defen-
dants incarcerated for longer periods while the courts consider which
law applies. Such delay could even run afoul of speedy trial requirements
for incarcerated defendants.7 Few would be comfortable with the no-
tion of releasing, on their own recognizance or on bond, defendants who
are charged with serious offenses while the court obtains an answer to a
certified question. If a defendant who is accused of a serious crime is
free while trial is pending, the merits of the case should allow such
treatment. Choice of law issues should never postpone a defendant's day
in court.
In conclusion, when the court is genuinely uncertain about the sub-
stance of a material element of state law, the court should favor applying
federal procedure rather than state procedure. Nonetheless, this prefer-
ence for federal procedure in this circumstance must be limited. Before
indulging it, the court should have genuine uncertainty as to what the
state law is. Conversely, if the court can ascertain state law with a rea-
sonable degree of probability, the court should not consider this factor at
all.72
70. See, e.g., John B. Corr & Ira P. Robbins, Interjurisdictional Certification and
Choice of Law, 41 VAND. L REv. 411, 418-44 (1988) (describing a variety of reasons
why certification is used less in civil cases than its proponents once anticipated).
71. The Federal Speedy Trial Act requires that incarcerated defendants be brought
to trial within 70 days of either filing an indictment or first appearance before a ju-
dicial officer, whichever date is later. 18 U.S.C. § 3161 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
72. The reader may wonder why the same federal courts that are so willing, and
even eager, to construe the meaning of state law in civil cases would be so timid
about intruding in matters of state criminal procedure. See, e.g., McKenna v. Ortho
Pharmaceutical Corp., 622 F.2d 657 (3d Cir.) (construing the law of a state outside
the Third Circuit), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 976 (1980). One possible answer is that
these courts are already predisposed, by and large, not to apply state procedure in
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D. Comity
There are many good reasons why one sovereign's judiciary should
show sensitivity toward the concerns of other judicial systems. In our
own federal structure of government, the reasons for courts to tread
lightly around one another seem even more pronounced. After all, federal
and state courts function concurrently in America, and society as a
whole benefits when the courts work well together. Comity, then, is a
powerful reason to reject an "in-your-face" approach to invoking the
Supremacy Clause. In short, federal, as well as state, courts benefit when
warm cooperation replaces frosty co-existence. 7
It is possible, of course, to overstate the utility of comity, or to
underappreciate the costs comity may impose on courts that subordinate
their forums' interests to the interests of another judicial system. For
that reason, even courts that try to accommodate their judicial neighbors
will typically do so only within a limited sphere that does not cut too
deeply into the forums' needs. In the area of federal prosecutions that
implicate the possible application of some state criminal procedure, how-
ever, quite a bit of state interest can probably be accommodated without
striking any sensitive federal nerves.
Concrete examples of federal courts accommodating state interests
require fact-specific analyses of particular cases. It can generally be said,
however, that the relative importance of a state interest must weigh
heavily in the comity balance. For example, if the state procedure at
issue arises from a fundamental state constitutional right, or if the state
has a particularly powerful reason for using its criminal procedure to
control its own police in a particular setting, then a federal court should
probably think twice before it blithely cites its own supremacy, or a very
modest conflicting federal interest, as a ground for rejecting state law.
Simply because the Supremacy Clause gives federal courts virtually un-
constrained power to reject state law does not mean the federal courts
criminal cases. A more likely explanation is that, in civil cases, principles developed
in Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), and related cases require that state law
be used, no matter how it is found. Id. at 78. Examples might include abstention,
certification, or speculating what the state law is. In federal criminal cases, by con-
trast, principles underlying the Supremacy Clause provide an alternative body of ap-
plicable law-federal criminal procedure-and affirmatively encourage the use of this
alternative.
73. As just one example of how federal courts may also benefit from good rela-
tions with their state counterparts, consider again the ability of federal courts to
certify uncertain questions of state law to state supreme courts. See supra note 48.
must exercise that power. Instead of invoking this power, federal courts
should carefully consider the benefits of true conity-judicial harmony,
good public policy, and justice.
It should be an unnecessary postscript to add that giving meaning to
comity in this context of federal and state criminal procedure requires
more than incanting the word solemnly and then ignoring the interests
that the word should evoke. At a minimum, comity seems to suggest that
sometimes federal courts should apply state law even when doing so
would result in an outcome distasteful to the federal court. Unfortunate-
ly, if that is the standard for comity, federal courts may have some
ground to cover before they meet it.74
E. Concerns About Forum Shopping
Courts and legislatures always seem a little ambivalent about forum
shopping. The Supreme Court, for example, has created new rules de-
signed to suppress forum shopping.75 On the other hand, the Supreme
Court quietly accepts that some decisions will enhance opportunities for
resourceful lawyers to forum shop." For its part, Congress often en-
courages forum shopping when it believes that it might increase the
chances for a party to get a fair hearing in court.77 A lawmaking body
encourages, or at least does not discourage, forum shopping, because the
lawmakers believe, rightly or wrongly, that forum shopping either serves
some important legal goal or is at least a necessary byproduct of reach-
74. See infra notes 101-22 and accompanying text (suggesting that federal courts
seem much more interested in admitting inculpatory evidence-under whichever law
would admit it-than in deferring to state interests).
75. See, e.g., Erie, 304 U.S. at 76-80 (disapproving old rule, in part because it en-
couraged inappropriate forum shopping); Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 (1965)
(reiterating that one of the aims of the Erie doctrine is discouragement of forum
shopping).
76. See, e.g., International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316-17 (1945)
(easing due process constraints on assertions of personal jurisdiction and thereby
expanding opportunities for forum shopping by plaintiffs).
77. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (permitting some cases to be
"removed" on a defendant's initiative from a state trial court to a federal district
court).
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ing such a goal.'8 Conversely, whenever courts cannot identify such a
desirable goal, they look unfavorably on forum shopping.
Federal courts that have confronted questions about the applicability
of state criminal procedure in federal criminal cases follow that pattern.
None of the decisions used in this study expressly approved of prosecu-
tors shopping for the most favorable forum, and one-United States v.
Pforzheimern-even indicated disapproval of the practice.' So far, so
good, but there is more.
The defendant in Pforzheimer sought the application of state criminal
procedure because, inter alia, "a state prosecutor who is faced with
evidence that might be suppressed in a state court prosecution may fo-
78. My favorite example of the conundra courts can create for themselves around
forum shopping arises in the context of Erie. In 1964, the Supreme Court held that,
when a diversity case in federal district court-diversity cases being a manifestation
of constitutionally encouraged forum shopping-is transferred from one federal judi-
cial district to another, the case should be tried according to the substantive law of
the original federal district. Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 635-37 (1964); see 28
U.S.C. § 1404 (1988) (creating forum shopping). The Van Dusen Court intended to
discourage turning § 1404 into a "forum-shopping instrument." Van Dusen, 376 U.S. at
635-37. Considering that the express language of § 1404 seems intended to encourage
forum shopping, although admittedly not necessarily forum shopping intended to
change the law applicable to a case, the Court appears to be overstepping its
bounds.
In any event, Van Dusen was exploited by a particularly resourceful attorney,
who used it in the following way. His client, injured in Pennsylvania, waited too long
to file suit under the applicable state statute of limitations. That might have been the
end of it, but the lawyer did not give up. Instead, the lawyer filed suit in a federal
district court in Mississippi, where there was personal jurisdiction over the defendant
and where the statute of limitations had not yet expired. Then the lawyer used 28
U.S.C. § 1404 to transfer the case from Mississippi to a federal district court in Penn-
sylvania. When the defendant moved to dismiss the suit as time-barred by the Penn-
sylvania statute, the attorney cited Van Dusen for the applicability of Mississippi law.
The Supreme Court agreed with the resourceful attorney. Thus, in Ferens v. John
Deere Co., 494 U.S. 516 (1990), the Supreme Court held that Erie's goal of discourag-
ing forum shopping was achieved by applying Van Dusen to the instant facts, thereby
requiring the application of Mississippi law.
Personally, I never tire of noting that Ferens encouraged a Pennsylvania plaintiff
to shop for a Mississippi forum (first example of forum shopping) and, particularly, a
Mississippi federal district court (second example of forum shopping) that would
apply a Mississippi statute of limitations. Thus, when the plaintiff moved successfully
to transfer the case to a federal district court in Pennsylvania (third example of fo-
rum shopping), the Mississippi limitation period would still apply. The Court approved
all that in the name of discouraging forum shopping under Erie.
79. 826 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1987).
80. Id. at 204.
rum shop and instead use the federal courts.""' Indeed, speaking from
the point of view of a law-abiding citizen' concerned about our national
problem of crime, I might applaud a group of law enforcement authori-
ties who had the relatively small amount of resourcefulness necessary to
think up that tactic themselves. Nevertheless, we should all recognize
that the tactic represents a rather brazen strain of forum shopping that,
if successful, might produce the suppression of an important state inter-
est.'
Yet, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit saw
things a bit differently. Pronouncing itself "unpersuaded" by the
defendant's argument, the Second Circuit offered the following explana-
tion: "A state prosecutor whose case relies on evidence that may be inad-
ndssible in a state court trial has no power or authority to effect a prose-
cution in federal court. The initiation of a federal prosecution depends
entirely on the discretion of the federal prosecutor."' Well, that's true.
Is it necessary to say that it is also irrelevant to the concern the defen-
dant raised?'
In any event, the Second Circuit notwithstanding, evidence and experi-
ence indicate that prosecutors and police do forum shop, for a variety of
reasons. In United States v. Moore,' for example, the court explained
that what prosecutors planned as a state prosecution was instead pur-
sued in federal court because "[flederal law calls for twice the maximum
punishment otherwise allowed."'7 Moreover, the particular kind of moti-
vation for forum shopping rejected as implausible in Pforzheimer-state
and federal prosecutors collaborating to get a federal conviction when a
state conviction is unobtainable-is seen in cases as well. The Second
81. Id.
82. The days in the old neighborhood, to which I alluded at the beginning of this
Article, are now securely tucked away behind the firm veneer of middle-aged respect-
ability.
83. For whatever it may be worth, the state law whose applicability in
Pforzheimer would arguably have resulted in suppression of evidence obtained in the
search was a matter of state constitutional law. Pforzheimer, 826 F.2d at 202.
84. Id. at 204.
85. This is too obvious even for me, but I'll say it anyway: It is elementary that
state prosecutors do not decide which cases get prosecuted in federal courts. Yet,
failing to recognize that state and federal prosecutors might cooperate with one an-
other to achieve a federal conviction when a state conviction is unobtainable is ex-
tremely unrealistic. In an opinion that otherwise has a lot to contribute to the sub-
ject that this Article addresses, the Second Circuit really missed the boat on this par-
ticular point.
86. 956 F.2d 843 (8th Cir. 1992).
87. Id. at 845. The federal law took into consideration the proximity to an elemen-
tary school in order to heighten the punishment. Id.
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Circuit decided United States v. Magda' eleven years before it consid-
ered Pforzheimer. The court reported that police uncovered the evidence
at issue in the case through a state search,' and the state trial court
suppressed the evidence under state law.' Thereafter, "(tihe state prose-
cution was ... discontinued."' The federal prosecution that was under
consideration in the Magda opinion followed.
Perhaps we can imagine explanations for Magda that do not implicate
the kind of forum shopping that Pforzheimer disregarded. Yet, alterna-
tive explanations challenge our imagination. The truth is that, when fed-
eral courts choose federal law over state law, they invite even moderate-
ly resourceful and determined state police and prosecutors to cooperate
with their federal counterparts.' In other words, those state officials
will be sorely tempted to forum shop for the court that will admit the
evidence. If this kind of forum shopping is undesirable, and it is neither
defended on its own merits nor justified as an acceptable cost of some
higher legal good,' then cases like Magda, where state officers appear
to have forum shopped to evade their own state law, should result in
state law being applied in the federal litigation.
F. Availability of Other Sanctions for Police Misconduct
As was mentioned earlier, federal courts that refer to "other sanctions"
for controlling state police have probably already decided against apply-
88. 547 F.2d 756 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 878 (1977).
89. Id. at 757.
90. Id. at 760.
91. Id. at 757 n.2.
92. This is not to say, of course, that cooperation between law enforcement per-
sonnel from different jurisdictions is a bad thing. Normally, it is a very good thing
indeed. I think it is fair to wonder, however, if it is a good thing when the coopera-
tion occurs as a kind of forum shopping, which the federal courts generally do not
encourage. But see United States v. Aiudi, 835 F.2d 943, 946 (lst Cir. 1987)
("Where ... no incentive exists for federal officials to encourage misconduct by
state police, exclusion of state-seized evidence is inappropriate without first consid-
ering whether the benefit obtained from excluding the evidence outweighs the result-
ing costs."), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 978 (1988). Later in the Aiudi opinion, however,
the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit acknowledged that "exclusion
of this evidence may deter the Woonsocket police from future unlawful conduct" Id.
93. Even Pforzheimer does not defend this kind of forum shopping. Instead, the
decision implicitly criticizes it by denying that it will or can occur when federal
courts reject the application of state procedure. United States v. Pforzheimer, 826
F.2d 200, 204 (2d Cir. 1987).
ing a state exclusionary rule. 4 Yet, all too often this reference to other
sanctions is disingenuous. The history of the federal courts' own Fourth
Amendment exclusionary rule shows that courts recognize that exclusion
is justifiable precisely because "other sanctions," such as administrative
punishment of police officers or civil suits by criminal defendants seek-
ing relief for alleged prior police misconduct, were ineffective deter-
rents. 6 There appears to be no basis for an assertion that such deter-
rents are any more effective at the state level. If federal courts intend to
suggest otherwise, they are being less than candid.' Of course, federal
courts that hold this view may consider the federal exclusionary rule in
the list of other sanctions that make the application of state law unnec-
essary.
97
In the context of the choice of law problem addressed by this Article,
there is one additional sanction available: the exclusion of evidence in a
state court proceeding when state police violate state criminal procedure.
The United States Courts of Appeals for the First and Third Circuits
referred to this additional sanction as reducing the need to apply a state
exclusionary rule in a federal proceeding.'
There is a basic problem with this assertion, which is clarified when
accepting the assumption that exclusionary rules actually deter police
misconduct.' A case that succeeds in federal court on the basis of evi-
dence inadmissible in state court does little to cool the excessive ardor
94. See supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text.
95. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 652-53 (1961) ("The obvious futility of relegating
the Fourth Amendment to the protection of other [non-exclusionary] remedies has,
moreover, [long] been recognized by this Court.").
96. One federal court acknowledged that there may be some deterrent benefit to
be derived from excluding evidence gathered by state officers in violation of state
law from federal trials. United States v. One Parcel of Real Property, 873 F.2d 7, 8
(1st Cir.) (admitting evidence in spite of concerns because excluding evidence from
state court proceeding is a better tailored deterrent), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 891
(1989).
97. See supra notes 11-15 and accompanying text.
98. One Parcel of Real Property, 873 F.2d at 8 (stating that exclusion of evidence
from state court only is a more "close fitting" deterrent); United States v. Rickus, 737
F.2d 360, 364 (3d Cir. 1984) (explaining that exclusion of evidence in a state prose-
cution is a possible "sanction").
99. If exclusionary rules that apply to searches subsequently deemed unlawful do
not deter such searches in the future, there is little point to those exclusionary rules.
The Supreme Court had occasion to question the effectiveness of the Fourth
Amendment's exclusionary rule. See United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 452 n.22
(1976) ("No empirical researcher, proponent or opponent of the rule, has yet been
able to establish with any assurance whether the rule has a deterrent effect even in
the situations in which it is now applied."). I accept the assumption put forward
regularly by courts that have adopted exclusionary rules that such rules may have a
significant deterrent effect on police behavior.
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of state police who might have been deterred by application of an
exclusionary rule in federal court. When the police lose in their own
state court, they may lose some cachet with supervisors. A police officer
may be overzealous, not only because she likes her work, but also be-
cause she hopes to advance within the system. The prospect of locking
up the a defendant in federal, rather than state, jail with a longer sen-
tence," may satisfy an officer's sense of justice, as well as improving
his or her status within the police department. Given the motivation for
the police to test the limits of their enforcement powers, the loophole
that federal courts often provide when they reject application of a state
exclusionary rule encourages police misconduct. Further, the loophole
may also be a motive for the kind of forum shopping that occurred in
United States v. Magda.'°
To summarize, the glimmer of "other sanctions" on a distant horizon is
simply not a good reason for rejecting state law in a federal proceeding
that is relying on evidence from state searches. Federal courts especially,
with their own history of developing exclusionary rules because other
sanctions did not effectively protect defendants' basic rights, should
know better than to suggest otherwise.
G. Reluctance to Expand Exclusionary Rules
Federal judicial concerns about undue expansion of exclusionary rules
are undoubtedly genuine. °2 In United States v. Shaffer,"° the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit gave one reason for the
cautious approach to expansion. "[I]f the states could require federal
courts to exclude evidence in federal criminal cases, some convictions
would undoubtedly be lost, and the enforcement of congressional policy
would be weakened."' 4 Speaking about potential expansion of
exclusionary rules in areas distantly related to this Article, the Supreme
100. These days, federal convictions often produce substantially more jail time than
state convictions. See, e.g., United States v. Moore, 956 F.2d 843, 845 (8th Cir. 1992)
(demonstrating that federal punishment can double state punishment).
101. 547 F.2d 756 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 878 (1977).
102. See, e.g., United States v. Aiudi, 835 F.2d 943, 945 (1st Cir. 1987) ("It is well
recognized that the costs of the [exclusionary] rule may in some instances outweigh
the benefits it provides in terms of deterring police misconduct."), cert. denied, 485
U.S. 978 (1988); United States v. Rickus, 737 F.2d 360, 364 (3d Cir. 1984) ("Proposed
extensions in the scope of the exclusionary rule are approached cautiously.").
103. 520 F.2d 1369 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1051 (1976).
104. Id. at 1372.
Court adopted the admonition that exclusionary rules are a "needed, but
grudgingly taken, medicament... [of which] no more should be
swallowed than is needed to combat the disease.
"1°5
The Court expresses a valid concern, but ignores other important con-
siderations. In the first place, the Third Circuit's concern in Shaffer that
federal courts might be required to apply state law in derogation of con-
gressional policy only could occur if federal courts chose to impose such
a requirement upon themselves. Perhaps that is a pretty good idea. If
federal courts generally deferred to state law, the courts would reserve
the right to use discretion to follow federal law in individual cases. With-
in this context, when federal courts applied state exclusionary rules, they
could do so only when they were confident that such an application
would not undermine important congressional policy in the way the
Third Circuit feared.
Secondly, we should not lose sight of the fact that it is not only state
exclusionary rules that courts could apply. As our earlier discussion of
United States v. Moore'" demonstrated, the application of state criminal
procedure is not necessarily identical to the application of state
exclusionary rules."7 Moore applied a state "no-knock" rule, which re-
sulted in the admission of evidence that would have been excluded un-
der the comparable federal rule."n
Finally, and most importantly, applying state criminal procedure-even
just state exclusionary rules-in federal cases where the search was
subject to state law should not be characterized as an expansion of state
law. An event in the evolution of Fourth Amendment exclusionary law
makes this point.
Until 1961, Fourth Amendment exclusionary requirements did not ap-
ply to state criminal prosecutions based on evidence obtained in search-
es by state police."° Yet, a year earlier the Supreme Court had eliminat-
ed one loophole in the exclusionary rules applicable to federal searches.
Elkins v. United States"' held that if state police obtained evidence in
a way that would have violated the Fourth Amendment if federal police
105. United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 454-55 n.29 (1976) (quoting Anthony G.
Amsterdam, Search, Seizure, and Section 2255: A Comment, 112 U. PA. L REV. 378,
388-89 (1964)). The Janis Court refused to suppress evidence seized by state officers
in violation of the Fourth Amendment when the evidence was introduced in a federal
civil tax proceeding. Id. at 460. The evidence had already been suppressed for pur-
poses of state and federal criminal proceedings. Id. at 439.
106. 956 F.2d 843 (8th Cir. 1992); see supra notes 5-18 and accompanying text.
107. Moore, 956 F.2d at 854.
108. Id.
109. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
110. 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
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had made the search, the evidence was to be excluded from federal pros-
ecutions."'
The reasoning of Elkins helps explain that the Court was not seeking
to extend the exclusionary rule to state proceedings, as it would do a
year later in Mapp v. Ohio."2 Instead, Elkins explained that a number
of states already apply the rule of exclusion to state searches that violate
the Fourth Amendment."' To permit a state's evidence to be used in a
federal court would "defeat the state's effort to assure obedience to the
Federal Constitution."" ' Additionally, Elkins made clear that the Court
intended to discourage federal'and state officers from working coopera-
tively to evade Fourth Amendment requirements."5 As Justice Stewart
stated, federal courts should not be "accomplices in the willful disobedi-
ence of a Constitution they are sworn to uphold.""6
However well-founded, a commitment to limit the expansion of the
exclusionary rule is a bit misplaced when it results in limited use of state
criminal procedure law in federal courts. Rather than being concerned
about the expansion of the exclusionary rule, courts should focus on
ensuring that state police will not be allowed to take evidence sup-
pressed in state court to federal prosecutors, thereby evading state law
and the values attendant to it.
H. Characterization of Law as Merely Procedural
The nature and importance of a state's interest behind its criminal
procedure are relevant factors federal courts should consider. Clearly, it
is reasonable to reject the application of state law if the state interest
implicated is not strong, or at least is not seriously harmed by
nonapplication. United States v. Dudek"7 illustrates this principle. In
111. Id. at 223 (altering old rule allowing admission of evidence).
112. See Mapp, 367 U.S. at 660.
113. Elkins, 364 U.S. at 219-20.
114. Id. at 221-22.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 223. Federal judges may have a lesser duty to uphold state law because
they have not explicitly sworn to uphold that law. Thus, there is a difference be-
tween a federal judge's duty to uphold federal law and his duty to uphold state law.
I do not believe, however, that the distinction is significant enough to provide much
justification by itself for a rejection of state law.
117. 530 F.2d 684 (6th Cir. 1976), appeal after remand, 560 F.2d 1288 (6th Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1037 (1978).
Dudek, state police lawfully obtained a valid search warrant." ' Their
mistake was that they did not return the warrant promptly or properly
verify the inventory of the search, as required by a state rule of criminal
procedure."9 The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
was uncertain whether, in that circumstance, a state court would sup-
press the evidence.'20 In any event, it held that federal law should con-
trol, in part because the violations at issue did not damage fundamental
state interests. 2 '
Dudek seems to be a reasonable decision, in which the violation of
state law was simply not severe enough to merit applying a state
exclusionary rule in federal court. Implicitly, the converse of this is also
true. If the extent of the state interest is the determinative factor, so that
weak state interests, as in Dudek, hold little sway, then should not im-
portant state interests get special treatment? In particular, if the state
interest originates in the state constitution or otherwise reflects a funda-
mental state value, the federal interest should defer to it. Nonetheless,
federal courts do not' regularly defer to strong state interests.'22
Moreover, the practice of disregarding fundamental state interests, even
as they may be reflected in state constitutions, supports my earlier asser-
tion that federal courts have a strong predisposition toward the applica-
tion of federal procedure."u More importantly, this practice is inappro-
priate in a federal system based on mutual respect among the various
sovereigns.
I. Joint Operations by Federal and State Police
The general public and the courts approve cooperation among police
from differing jurisdictions,' 4 and this cooperation has practical impli-
cations for choice of law issues.
A fair number of cases conclude that choice of law decisions should
not turn on whether federal officers participated in a search with state
police."n Others reach the same conclusion as long as federal participa-
118. Id. at 685.
119. Id. at 686.
120. Id. at 687.
121. Id. at 691.
122. See, e.g., United States v. Aiudi, 835 F.2d 943 (1st Cir. 1987) (rejecting applica-
tion of arguable protection under Rhode Island constitution), cert. denied, 485 U.S.
978 (1988); United States v. Pforzheimer, 826 F.2d 200, 202-04 (2d Cir. 1987) (reject-
ing application of arguable protection under Vermont constitution); United States v.
Combs, 672 F.2d 574, 578 (6th Cir.) (rejecting application of arguable protection un-
der Kentucky constitution), cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1111 (1982).
123. See supra notes 28-38 and accompanying text
124. See, e.g., Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 221-23 (1960) (enthusiastically
approving joint efforts by federal and state police).
125. See, e.g., United States v. Jorge, 865 F.2d 6, 10 n.2 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 490
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tion did not mean that federal officers were in charge of the search.2"
Still other cases hold that the absence of federal officers is a reason for
applying state law.'27
I have to confess my own uncertainty about how to weigh this factor,
but a few points seem fundamental. First, if state police participate in a
joint search, they are on the scene only because a state government pro-
vides badges that give them authority not vested in ordinary citizens.
Even if, in some unusual circumstances, state officers receive the status
of special federal deputies, that status is probably conferred only be-
cause the recipients were state officers in the first place. Thus, if agents
participate in a search because the foundation of their authority derives
from state law, the state has an interest in regulating how those agents
behave. Yet, the strength of that state interest may vary substantially
from one circumstance to another.
An important variable in determining the strength of the state interest
is the degree to which the state police are making on-the-scene deci-
sions, in which case the state's responsibility for police behavior is great-
er than when officers act under strict guidelines. Further, if police be-
have inappropriately, the state's interest in preventing improper searches
is affected more than if the state police merely supplied personnel who
are deployed under federal control. Thus, in mixed searches where state
police significantly control the operation, the state's interest in what hap-
pens in the course of a search is strong, and the case for applying state
criminal procedure in subsequent prosecutions is compelling.
Even if state police are only pawns in the search, the state still has a
responsibility for their behavior. Some state interest attaches even to
circumstances in which federal control of a joint search is nearly abso-
lute. If there are other reasons that weigh in favor of applying state law,
such as the search implicating a strongly held state constitutional value,
U.S. 1027 (1989) (finding that whether search was entirely under state control not
relevant to choice of law decision); Jackson v. United States, 354 F.2d 980, 981 (1st
Cir. 1965) (applying state law without regard to fact that both federal and state offi-
cers participated in a joint search).
126. See, e.g., United States v. Krawiec, 627 F.2d 577, 580 (1st Cir. 1980) (holding
that substantial participation by federal officers is not relevant when all involved in
search believed it was conducted under state warrant and for purposes of state pros-
ecution).
127. See, e.g., United States v. Moore, 956 F.2d 843, 847 (8th Cir. 1992) (stating that
state police "act[ing] totally without federal involvement" helps justify application of
state law).
even a minimal participation of state police in a search might tip the
choice of law decision in favor of state law.
Weighing the strength of interests applies to federal interests as well.
Obviously, where federal officers control a search or provide the bulk of
the personnel, a strong federal interest may be found. Other consider-
ations being equal, this works in favor of applying federal law to subse-
quent prosecutions in federal court.
The difficulty for choice of law purposes is to determine who con-
trolled various aspects of a joint search. The range of factual possibilities
and scenarios is limitless, providing almost endless possibilities for the
kind of police "subterfuge and evasion" that trouble courts." Cases
involving joint investigations apparently follow a simple rule: if federal
officers participate, federal law will control.'29 This rule circumvents the
difficulty of determining who did what and under whose control. It is un-
derstandable that federal courts prefer a bright-line rule to avoid "intri-
cate analytical maneuvers to escape a poorly conceived exception" to the
practice of applying federal law."
That's good enough for me, at least in many cases. When the facts of a
joint federal and state search are unclear, courts should apply federal
law in a federal prosecution. Nonetheless, the creation of a few narrow
exceptions to this rule seems wise. If the court is persuaded that the
police either undertook a joint search with the purpose of escaping their
own sovereign's law, or if there are grounds for believing that the police
deliberately muddied the waters so that it is unclear who did what, a
court should justly weigh such factors in favor of applying whichever law
the police disfavored.
This proposal carries a high price-the loss of probative evidence. At
the same time, however, it serves the important interest, in both federal
and state courts, of discouraging police from exploiting the law.
J. State Courts as Laboratories for Criminal Procedure
Where this factor has weight, it favors application of state law. Wheth-
er it should have weight depends on whether one believes the state's role
as a laboratory, which is manifestly useful, is significantly undermined
when federal courts do not use state law, and the prosecution presents
evidence supplied by the state. Reasonable people may believe that little'
is lost in such circumstances and that therefore this factor should have
128. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 222 (1960).
129. See, e.g., United States v. Sutherland, 929 F.2d 765, 770 (1st Cir.) (considering
application of federal law whenever federal officers participate in a search), cert.
denied, 502 U.S. 822 (1991).
130. Id. at 771.
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little weight. 3' I am inclined to agree, but the issue here is not whether
the state can serve as a laboratory after federal courts reject state law.
Rather, the greater issue is whether a strong state interest developed in a
state laboratory will get the respect it deserves in a federal court.
VI. THE NEED FOR RESPECT
A. Respect for State Law
So far, the bulk of this Article has addressed the need for federal
courts to respect state interests. In practical terms, such respect would
probably result in applying state law somewhat more often than normally
occurs in the cases examined in this Article. Federal courts must also
demonstrate a little more respect for state laws, as well as their underly-
ing interests.
B. Respect for Rules of Law
At the beginning of this Article, I suggested that federal courts con-
fronting questions about the applicability of state criminal procedure in
federal courts display two tendencies: (1) to apply their own law of crim-
inal procedure, and (2) to apply the law that will admit the inculpatory
evidence produced by a police search. The two tendencies generally
operate in harmony in most of the cases examined in this Article. They
collide, however, when federal courts choose state law that admits incul-
patory evidence over federal law that would suppress the evidence."
The inescapable conclusion, reached from exploring the cases cited in
this Article, is that federal courts are reluctant to suppress evidence that
is crucial, probative, and inculpatory. Yet, such a conclusion may not be
completely accurate for two reasons. First, most of the cases discussed
above are appellate decisions in which a defendant has already been
found guilty. In other words, it is the defendants who are appealing rul-
ings relating to the application or preclusion of state law. Considering
that, by and large, more appeals fail than succeed, courts may seem dis-
131. Cf. United States v. Combs, 672 F.2d 574, 578 (6th Cir.) (rejecting this argu-
ment because states have no power to force their criminal procedure on federal
courts), cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1111 (1982).
132. See supra notes 28-38, 101-22 and accompanying text.
133. See, e.g., United States v. Moore, 956 F.2d 843 (8th Cir. 1992) (admitting evi-
dence under state law that federal law would have suppressed); Jackson v. United
States, 354 F.2d 980 (lst Cir. 1965) (same).
inclined to overturn the fact finder's decision for procedural reasons.
Thus, a tendency to choose state or federal law at the appellate level
may not completely reflect the choices of lower courts. The possibility
lingers that appeals may fail not so much because they are appeals, but
because the appellate courts appear predisposed to use probative incul-
patory evidence to convict.
Second, our sense of justice is offended when guilty defendants go free
due to police misconduct. Our sense of decency requires that the guilty
be punished. Federal judges, who deal with criminals and their victims
daily, probably feel that way too. For that reason, they may be inclined
to seek techniques that admit evidence in particular cases. How many of
us would act differently?
Of course, a judicial proceeding should be conducted with the detach-
ment that characterizes a fair process. Indeed, when federal courts ma-
nipulate discretionary factors that they themselves developed in order to
produce particular results, they show diminished respect, not only for
state law, but also for their own rules. Courts thus risk diminishing the
moral grounding on which judicial authority rests. For the most part,
courts have created basic, workable instruments for making necessary
choices between state and federal criminal procedure, but the instru-
ments need refining. More importantly, courts must resist temptations to
bend their own rules to produce particular results in individual cases.
Courts should show a little more respect for themselves.
VII. CONCLUSION
I began this Article with a complaint that conflicts do not get enough
respect, the general view being that conflicts are impractical, indeed, "ab-
struse." Perhaps that is so. Yet, when resolving conflicts of law, courts
are beginning to recognize the usefulness of standards that conflicts
scholars have discussed for many years. Courts' acknowledgement that
conflicts may offer factors and principles to aid in the courts' analyses
may reassure those who have contributed to the development of those
factors. Yet, only when courts actually use the tools in their decisions,
will conflicts-and conflicts scholars-finally get true respect.
